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The Sunk-Cost Fallacy 
Imagine that you just rented a DVD from Redbox at Target. You drove 
through traffic for an hour and arrived at the store for the DVD only to find 
out that you have to wait 15 minutes for the machine to be fixed because it is 
broken. You travel home, stick the DVD into its player, and begin to watch 
the movie. After 10 minutes, you realize you’re bored to tears. Do you stop 
watching the movie immediately, wait to see if it gets better, or watch it until 
the end?         
 If you continue watching the movie—even though you are bored—
you’ve committed the sunk-cost fallacy. Derived from economic theory and 
with applications in psychology, the sunk-cost fallacy refers to a decision 
making bias that people often have to continue investing future resources, 
whether time, money, or effort, into something they have already made prior 
investments in (Arkes & Blumer, 1985).  The sunk-cost effect has been 
studied mainly regarding hypothetical decisions of everyday problems (Frisch 
1993; Klaczynski, 2001; Stanovich, 1999), for example like the problem 
stated above: Continuing to watch a boring movie until it ends because you 
paid for it (Strough et al., 2008). The sunk-cost effect has also been studied in 
real-life settings. Staw and Hoang (1995) investigated how the sunk-cost 
effect influenced how much NBA players were paid and how long they 
remained hired despite performance. The researchers found that despite 
players’ on-court performance or number of injuries, highly drafted players 
were retained longer. Because the sunk-cost effect is shown in both 
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hypothetical and real-life situations, hypothetical situations are valuable and 
efficient tools for examining variables that might affect the sunk-cost fallacy.
 Although an abundance of sunk-cost research has focused on 
individual situations, or situations in which a person’s decision is not the 
result of his or her relationship with someone else (such as deciding to watch a 
boring movie or buying season tickets for a game), there is scant literature 
about how the sunk-cost effect may influence interpersonal situations. 
Coleman (2009) studied how the sunk-cost effect was related to commitment 
to dates arranged online. He found that as prior investments increased, the 
participants’ likelihood to commit to a blind date increased, even if the date 
was described as “inferior.” In a similar study, the sunk-cost fallacy was 
examined in real-life relationships. Rusbult (1980a, 1983) found that the 
larger intrinsic investments (money, effort, time, emotions) were in the current 
relationship, the less likely a participant would be to express interest in dating 
an alternative person. Even in cases in which participants reported high 
relationship costs, however, participants still reported being committed to 
their relationships if prior investments had been made.   
Individual v. Interpersonal Situations 
As previous research illustrates, the sunk-cost effect has implications 
for decision-making behavior in both individual and interpersonal situations. 
To date, no study has yet investigated how resources invested into both 
situation types might differ because of the situation. For example, could an 
investment of money drive the sunk-cost effect in an individual situation but 
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have no effect in an interpersonal situation? This type of question has yet to be 
answered by sunk-cost research and was a goal of the present study.
 Perhaps one major difficulty in answering this question results from an 
unclear understanding of how resource types influence the sunk-cost effect. 
Researchers have noted that time, money, and effort predict the sunk-cost 
effect, but most researchers have not shown how each of these resources 
individually influences the sunk-cost effect (Arkes & Blumer, 1985). One 
article, however, has shown how investments of time and money could have 
different influences on the sunk-cost effect (Soman, 2001). Soman found that 
participants were more likely to commit the sunk-cost fallacy for prior 
investments of money than for prior investments of time, unless time was 
expressed in the form of monetary quantities. In addition, Coleman (2010a) 
extended Soman’s research by investigating how an investment of effort was 
similar to and different from time and money investments. He found that prior 
investments of money predicted the sunk-cost fallacy, but prior investments of 
time and effort did not.       
 While Soman and Coleman’s research aids sunk-cost research by 
illustrating how different resources affect sunk costs, more research is needed 
to investigate additional resource types and their effects on sunk costs. 
Research by Goodfriend and Agnew (2008) suggests that emotions and self-
concept may also be resources invested into a romantic relationship and that 
these resources may be predictive of the sunk-cost effect. While emotions and 
self-concept are explored as investments in the research that links romantic 
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relationships with the sunk-cost effect, these investments are nearly absent 
from research on the sunk-cost effect in individual situations. To extend 
Coleman’s research, an investigation of these two investment types in addition 
to the most commonly cited three (time, money, effort) could broaden 
peoples’ understanding of the sunk-cost fallacy in both types of situations. 
Investigating Another Type of Interpersonal Relationship 
In addition to the paucity of articles describing how investment types 
directly influence the sunk-cost effect, another major limitation is the lack of 
research about how the sunk-cost effect affects friendships. Most of the 
research done on interpersonal relationships has focused on romantic 
relationships. There is some research that suggests, however, that the sunk-
cost effect may also influence friendships.     
 Rusbult (1980b) studied commitment along with satisfaction and 
alternatives in college friendships.  She found that prior investments helped to 
predict future commitment in friendships. Rusbult’s research suggests that like 
romantic relationships, friendships may also be vulnerable to the sunk-cost 
effect if people have invested resources such as time, effort, and emotions that 
are inextricably connected to the friendship and thus are hard to recover 
(Rusbult, 1980b). Examining both types of interpersonal relationships in the 
same study could be helpful in determining exactly which individual resources 
may predict future commitment in both relationship types.  
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Psychological Motives Underpinning the Sunk-Cost Effect 
Researchers posit that the sunk-cost effect results because of the 
“Don’t waste” rule or the idea that people are unable to ignore the costs that 
have already been sunk into an endeavor. Thus, they continue to invest more 
resources—or escalate commitment in response to sunk costs (Arkes & 
Ayton, 1999; Staw, 1981). In one study, Arkes and Blumer showed how the 
“Don’t waste rule” accounted for decisions made. The team asked participants 
to imagine spending $100 on a ticket for a weekend ski trip to Michigan and 
then several weeks later buying a $50 ticket for a weekend ski trip to 
Wisconsin. Participants were specifically told: “You imagine enjoying the 
Wisconsin trip more than the Michigan trip, but then you notice that each trip 
will occur on the same weekend and that it’s too late to sell or return either 
ticket.” Participants were asked to select which trip they would go on. The 
researchers found that participants selected to go on the less desirable 
Michigan trip, because they thought going on the Wisconsin trip albeit less 
expensive would “waste” twice as much money (Arkes & Blumer, 1985).
 Researchers continue to investigate the psychological motivations 
underpinning escalating commitment to a course of action, or continuing to 
work on an assignment even when the costs are evident or the payoffs aren’t. 
Economist Glen Whyte (1986) found that escalating commitment could be 
explained through prospect theory or the idea that people frame decisions 
from a reference point and the decision to escalate commitment is based on 
both negative and positive consequences. In his model, Whyte shows that if an 
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action has negative consequences, a person’s decision to commit further 
resources is framed as a choice between losses, whereas if the action has 
positive consequences, the choice to continue investing further resources is 
framed as a choice between both gains. Despite either consequence, Whyte 
posits that either consequence would lead to escalation commitment because 
negative consequences would lead to risk-seeking behavior and positive 
consequences to risk-averse behavior (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; Whyte, 
1986).         
 Escalating commitment is directly linked to the sunk-cost effect, 
because prior investments usually enter into future decisions even in the face 
of a course of action that’s going terribly awry (Staw, 1981). Economist Barry 
Staw (1981) explained that people might escalate commitment because of 
self-justification or the need to justify prior choices (Brockner, 1992; Staw, 
1976; Staw, 1981). Self-justification is directly linked to the sunk-cost effect, 
because in the need to justify prior choices, people often invest additional 
resources. An illustrative example that Staw describes in his study is an 
administrator that has allocated research funds to an operating division of a 
company and tries to justify his or her potentially ineffective decision by 
escalating commitment and committing future resources to the project, thus 
committing the sunk-cost fallacy.  
Predictions of Five Resources 
 The present study investigated which resources: time, money, effort, 
emotion, or self-concept, would be most likely to lead people to commit the 
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sunk-cost fallacy in an individual and interpersonal situation. Because there is 
limited research about how each resource type influences the sunk-cost effect, 
I extrapolated from other areas and concepts in psychology in order to make 
predictions about the role each resource would play in influencing the sunk-
cost effect. 
Money         
 An entire body of sunk-cost literature supports the prediction that 
money leads people to commit the sunk-cost fallacy in individual situations 
(Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Phillips, Battalio & Kogut, 1991; Staw, 1981). 
Soman (2001) suggested that this might be the case, because people are better 
at mentally accounting for money than they are for time. Some of the reasons 
he listed for a difference in the sunk-cost effect for money and time were: time 
cannot be inventoried or replaced; time is not as easily aggregated as money; 
and accounting for money (unlike accounting for time) is a routine activity 
(Soman, 2001). In contrast, Goodfriend and Agnew (2008) found that money 
was not a predictor of commitment in romantic relationships, because couples 
often value nonmaterial resources over material resources such as money and 
because happiness is more directly linked to nonmaterial resources such as 
emotions and time (Diener, et al., 1999; Goodfriend & Agnew, 2008). This 
research helped me to predict that money would increase the likelihood of 
people committing the sunk-cost fallacy in individual situations but wouldn’t 
increase the likelihood of people committing the sunk-cost fallacy in 
interpersonal situations. 
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Time 
    Soman (2001) predicted that time wouldn’t lead participants to commit 
the sunk-cost fallacy, because individuals account for time and money 
differently. In six separate experiments, he gave participants scenarios in 
which the only thing he varied was a time or money investment. Soman found 
that while participants committed the sunk-cost fallacy for money, the sunk-
cost effect disappeared for time investments. Soman concluded that 
participants might be unable or unwilling to account for time in the same way 
that they account for money (Soman, 2001). While Soman’s research provides 
evidence that time does not lead to the sunk-cost effect in individual 
situations, research on interpersonal relationships suggests that time is an 
intangible investment that predicts the sunk-cost effect (Goodfriend & Agnew, 
2008). Thus, based on this research, it was logical to predict that time would 
not lead people to commit the sunk-cost effect in the individual situation used 
in this study, but that time would lead to the sunk-cost effect in the 
interpersonal situation. 
Emotion 
 Little research has been done to explain what effect invested emotions 
might have on the sunk-cost fallacy. Coleman (2010b) investigated the role 
emotions would play on participants’ likelihood to continue signing up online 
for a class. He found that participants that were induced to feel anger 
committed the sunk-cost effect but that participants that were induced to feel 
 9
fear did not commit the sunk-cost fallacy. Coleman reasoned that the findings 
might have occurred because participants that are angry are likely to feel that 
they have control of the situation, whereas those that are fearful might have 
less circumstantial control. As a result, those who perceive themselves as 
having more control might be more likely to escalate commitment, thus 
committing the sunk-cost fallacy, while those who feel that they have little 
control are less likely to escalate commitment (Coleman, 2010b). 
 Although Coleman’s research might be helpful in predicting how 
induced emotions might predict the sunk-cost effect, his research does little to 
suggest how emotions invested in interpersonal relationships could predict the 
sunk-cost effect in that context. Some research suggests that emotions may 
lead people to remain in relationships that they aren’t necessarily satisfied 
with (Rusbult, 1980a), although Rusbult doesn’t explicitly state why this 
might be the case. Other research supports the idea that emotions exert an 
important influence on cognition and decision-making across everyday 
problems (Bower, 1981; Labovie-Vief, 1992; Sinnott, 1989). 
Effort 
 Coleman (2010a) investigated whether effort would lead participants 
to commit the sunk-cost fallacy. Coleman found that invested effort did not 
produce the sunk-cost effect. Coleman reasoned that people aren’t good at 
mentally accounting for effort because they’re not well versed in keeping 
track of this type of investment. Coleman also explained that there were 
alternative explanations for the sunk-cost effect other than the sunk-cost effect 
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such as cognitive dissonance, self-perception theory, and learned 
industriousness. Coleman’s research provides support for my prediction that 
invested effort will not lead people to commit the sunk-cost fallacy for 
individual situations. Effort, however, is described as an intangible investment 
that leads people to commit the sunk-fallacy in interpersonal relationships 
(Goodfriend & Agnew, 2008). As a result, I predicted that effort would lead to 
the sunk-cost effect in interpersonal relationships in our study. 
Self-Concept 
 Perhaps the most under investigated area of sunk-cost research deals 
with how the self-concept is related to the sunk-cost fallacy. We were 
particularly interested in investigating self-concept, most simplistically 
defined as “a person’s perception of him- or herself.  Self-concept is 
influenced by peoples’ interactions with their environments and by 
attributions for their own behavior (Marsh & Shavelson, 1985; Shavelson, 
Hubner, & Stanton, 1976).      
 Peoples’ self-perceptions could potentially influence whether they 
escalate commitment to a particular course of action. Coleman suggested this 
when he argued that there were alternative explanations of effort other than 
the sunk-cost effect (Coleman, 2010a). One of the theories he discussed—
cognitive dissonance theory—could provide the link between the sunk-cost 
fallacy and self-concept. Some research on cognitive dissonance describes it 
as a psychological discomfort that people are motivated to decrease (Elliot & 
Devine, 1994). Oftentimes, cognitive dissonance results when an individual’s 
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actions conflict with his or her view of his or herself and must resolve that 
conflict by changing his or her behavior or adding a cognition that’s consistent 
with one’s view of his or herself (Festinger, 1957).     
 If participants view themselves as caring and supportive and are told 
that a friend or romantic partner has stopped talking to them and participants 
are asked to select how much longer they’d remain in the relationship, 
cognitive dissonance theory implies that participants may choose a behavior in 
line with their self-perceptions. In this particular example, participants may be 
more likely to remain in the relationship in order to reduce any dissonant view 
of themselves as distant. This escalation of commitment suggests that people 
with this type of self-perception are likely to commit the sunk-cost fallacy. On 
the flip side, people that view themselves as distant and detached in a 
friendship or relationship would be unlikely to change their behavior during 
cognitive dissonance. Thus, we can expect that someone who views his or 
herself that way would end the relationship, thus not committing the sunk-cost 
fallacy. All in all, I predicted that participants in the high investment condition 
for self-concept (caring and supportive) would commit the sunk-cost effect, 
while participants in the low invest condition would not fall prey to the sunk-
cost effect. 
Personality Variables 
 We were interested in investigating how personality could moderate 
the sunk-cost fallacy. Research about personality traits and the sunk-cost 
effect were limited, so we looked at articles that linked personality traits to 
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escalation of commitment. Moon et al. (2003) divided neuroticism into 
anxiety and depression and investigated how those facets of the neuroticism 
construct influenced escalation of commitment. The authors found a 
moderately significant effect of neuroticism on escalation of commitment. 
Anxious individuals were more likely to escalate commitment while 
depressed individuals were not. Conscientiousness, however, did not predict 
escalation of commitment, although achievement strivers were more likely to 
escalate commitment (Moon, 2001). Based on these studies, we predicted that 
neuroticism and conscientiousness would predict the sunk-cost effect, because 
they may lead participants to escalate commitment. 
The Present Study 
The present study sought to address the limitations of extant sunk-cost 
research.  A major goal of the present study was to answer the question: 
Which type of invested resources would result in the highest sunk-cost fallacy 
scores? To do so, I investigated five resources that people likely invest in 
individual and interpersonal situations. The current study also sought to 
investigate how these resources may be alike or different in individual and 
interpersonal situations, so these situations were investigated simultaneously 
for comparison purposes. Another goal of the present study was to identify 
whether any personality traits predicted the sunk-cost effect.  
 There are two independent variables in this study. One independent 
variable is the situation type (or context) that was divided into two levels: 
individual and interpersonal. These levels were further divided into romantic 
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relationship and friend, two important types of interpersonal relationships. 
Another independent variable is the type of invested resources that we divided 
into five levels: time, money, effort, self-concept, and emotions. There are two 
dependent variables. One dependent variable is the sunk-cost fallacy. The 
second dependent variable is personality that is measured using a 10-item 
inventory.         
 The present study sought to accomplish its goals by investigating how 
the sunk-cost effect influences a population of college students, an age group 
that may be particularly vulnerable to the sunk-cost effect based on prior 
research that found that younger adults are more likely than older adults to 
commit the sunk-cost fallacy (Strough et al., 2008). The present study is also a 
pioneer in determining what types of investments are important to college-
aged students—both in individual and interpersonal situations.  
Method 
Design  
 A 3x5 mixed-factorial design was used. The between-subjects variable 
was resource. Participants were randomly assigned to receive one of the five 
resources (money, time, emotion, effort, self-concept). The within-subjects 
variable was situation. Each participant answered questions based on 3 levels 
(exam, romantic relationship, and friend). The dependent variable was the 
sunk-cost fallacy score. 
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Participants 
Students at Syracuse University (N=207) were recruited through an 
email announcement, via SONA, and by word of mouth. Participants were 
brought into the laboratory where they completed the study. They volunteered 
or received research credit or extra credit for their psychology classes as 
compensation for participating. There were 81 male and 126 female students 
that ranged in age from 18 to 25 (M= 19.54, SD= 1.39). 
Procedure 
Participants were brought into the laboratory and were seated at a table 
where they completed the informed consent form. After participants 
completed the consent form, I selected a slip of paper numbered Version 1 
through 30. Participants were randomly assigned to complete a version, each 
of which was counterbalanced. Sunk-cost fallacy scores did not significantly 
differ by version. There were five versions for each resource. Each participant 
completed a series of questions for three situations and based on one resource. 
Each situation had two questions that were identical except that one involved 
high investment of a resource and the other, a low investment. In all, each 
student completed six questions for Packet A.     
 The individual situation asked them how much longer they would 
continue to take a standardized exam if they hadn’t gotten the score they 
needed the first time around. The friendship and romantic relationship 
vignettes were modeled similarly. Participants were asked how much longer 
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they would remain in a friendship or romantic relationship in which their 
friend or partner had recently stopped responding to text messages, phone 
calls, and was not supportive of their goals and interests.  
 Next, participants completed a 10-item personality inventory. Finally, 
participants completed a demographics questionnaire that asked them to report 
such things as their household income and whether or not they had been in a 
romantic relationship or friendship in which their partner or friend stopped 
talking to them. In addition, participants were asked to rate the five resources 
in order of importance for each situation type. After participants completed 
the questionnaire, their data was entered into a computer, and the sunk-cost 
fallacy was calculated and personality inventories were scored.  
Measures 
Decision vignettes. Vignettes were similar to the ones used by Strough 
et al. (2008) that they adopted from Frisch (1993). The scenarios included 
different situation types such as taking a standardized exam after failing to 
meet a desired goal the first time and remaining committed to a friendship or 
romantic relationship that was going bad. An example of the vignette for the 
individual situation for effort was: “You spent a lot of effort preparing for a 
standardized exam. After taking the exam, you received a score lower than 
what’s required to be admitted to your program of choice. Considering all the 
factors involved, how many more times will you take the exam?” There were 
five choices for participants to select from: don’t take it again, take it one 
more time, take it two more times, take it three more times, or take it 
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indefinitely (until I get the score I need). Participants received a low 
investment and high investment version of each situation (See Appendix). An 
exam situation was selected because it is a situation in which college students 
have experience and are likely to be able to relate to.  
 Vignettes for the interpersonal situations were similar, and the only 
words that were changed in each were friend and partner. An example of an 
interpersonal situation vignette for money was: “You’ve been friends with 
someone and have spent about $500 on gifts for your friend. Lately, your 
friend hasn’t been returning your calls or texts messages and has not been 
supportive of your goals and interests. How much longer will you remain 
friends?” Participants could select from five choices: end the friendship 
immediately, wait for a couple weeks to see if the friendship improves, wait 
for a month to see if the friendship improves, wait for 6 months to see if the 
friendship improves, or remain committed to the friendship. Participants also 
received a low investment and high investment question of each situation. In 
this particular example, the low investment condition for money was $40. 
Computing the sunk-cost fallacy. To compute the sunk-cost fallacy 
score, each participant’s decisions for the low investment and high investment 
questions were compared. If a participant indicated that he or she would spend 
more time for the high investment than for the low investment choice, a score 
of 1 was assigned to indicate that the sunk-cost fallacy occurred. In addition, 
we computed normatively-correct decision scores (Klaczynski, 2001). The 
normatively correct decision was made if a participant chose the same answer 
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choice for the low and high investment conditions. A score of 0 was assigned. 
Finally, an error score was computed. Participants made errors if they 
indicated they would spend more future time in the low investment condition 
than in the high investment condition. Only sunk-cost fallacy scores are 
analyzed in this paper.  
Ten-item personality inventory. We included a 10-item personality 
inventory known as the Big Five Inventory-10 (BFI-10) (Rammstedt & John, 
2007). The BFI-44 is shown to have high convergent validity with the 
established measures of the Big Five personality traits (John, Naumann, & 
Soto, 2008). The BFI-10 is a reliable and valid alternative to the BFI-44 for a 
brief personality assessment (Rammstedt & John, 2007). There are 10 phrases 
on the inventory. Participants were asked the question, “How well do the 
following statements describe your personality?” Some of the phrases that 
participants selected from were:  “…is reserved,” “…is generally trusting,” 
“tends to be lazy…” Participants rated their responses on a 5-point Likert-type 
scale. An answer of 1 indicated that participants disagreed strongly. An 
answer of 5 meant that participants agreed strongly.     
Results 
Resource Type and Situation Type Interaction 
A mixed 3x5 ANOVA was used for the between-subjects independent 
variable, situation type with three levels (individual, romantic relationship, 
and friendship), and the within-subjects independent variable, resource type 
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with five levels (money, time, emotion, effort, and self-concept) and to 
determine both of the independent variables’ effect on the dependent variable, 
sunk cost fallacy scores.      
 Significant main effects of resource type F(4,200) =  8.12, p < .001, 
ηp
2  
= 0.40 and situation type F(2,400) = 16.54, p <.001, ηp2 = .076, were 
qualified by a significant two-way interaction of Resource X Situation 
F(8,400) = 5.69, p < .001, ηp2 = .140. In order to localize the interaction 
effect, post-hoc tests were performed to assess the simple effect of situation at 
each level of resource. A Bonferroni-type correction was used to reduce Type 
I errors associated with multiple post-hoc tests; alpha was set at .05. To follow 
up significant simple effects of situation, I performed multiple comparisons of 
situation at each level of the significant simple effect of resource type. 
Money 
The simple effect of money was statistically significant F(2,82) = 3.69, 
p < .05. There was no statistically significant difference (p = 1.00) between 
the means for the exam situation (M = .23, SD= .421) and the friend situation 
(M = .44, SD =.497), but there was a marginal difference between the exam 
and romantic relationship situations (M = .43, SD = .496). The difference in 
sunk-cost fallacy scores between the interpersonal relationships was non-
significant (p = .17). 
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Time 
The simple effect of time was statistically significant F(2,80) = 37.99, 
p < .001. Students that received the time resource (p < .001) were more likely 
to commit the sunk-cost fallacy for the romantic relationship situation (M = 
.43, SD = .496) and friend situation (M = .44, SD =.497) than for the exam 
situation (M = .23, SD = .421).  The difference in sunk-cost fallacy scores 
between the two types of interpersonal relationships was non-significant (p = 
1.00). 
Emotion 
The simple effect of emotion was non-significant F(2,80) = 2.53, p = 
.086. The means of participants’ sunk-cost fallacy scores did not significantly 
differ among the romantic relationship situation (M= .43, SD= .496), friend 
situation (M= .44, SD=.497), or exam situation (M = .23, SD= .421). 
Effort 
The simple effect of effort was non-significant F(2,80) = 1.58, p = 
.212 The means of students’ sunk-cost fallacy scores did not differ 
significantly among the romantic relationship situation (M= .43, SD= .496), 
friend situation (M= .44, SD=.497), or exam situation (M = .23, SD= .421).  
Self-Concept 
The simple effect of self-concept was non-significant F(2,78) = .275, p 
= .760 . The means of students’ sunk-cost fallacy scores in the romantic 
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relationship situation (M= .43, SD= .496), friend situation (M = .44, SD 
=.497), and exam situation (M = .23, SD = .421) were not significantly 
different from each other.   
Personality 
Preliminary multiple linear regression analyses showed that 
personality traits did not predict sunk-cost fallacy scores. I also examined 
neuroticism and conscientiousness as covariates in our analysis of variance. 
They were non-significant.       
 I conducted an exploratory analysis to find out whether sunk-cost 
scores differed by age or sex. Although age was not a significant factor, sunk-
cost fallacy scores did differ by a Sex x Situation interaction, F(2,390) = 3.58, 
p < .05, ηp2  = .02. Follow-ups showed that men had higher sunk-cost fallacy 
scores for the exam situation, women had higher sunk-cost scores for the 
friend situation, and there was no sex difference for the romantic relationship 
situation. Because there was no main effect of sex and sex did not interact 
with resource, nor was there a three-way interaction of sex, situation, and 
resource, I did not include sex as an additional factor in our main analyses. 
Discussion 
 The present study investigated the relationship between situation and 
resource type and hypothesized that there would be a significant interaction 
between the two independent variables. My hypothesis was supported, 
revealing that the simple main effect of situation type changed over the five 
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levels of resource or that the simple main effect of resource type changed over 
the three levels of situation. To determine more information about the 
interaction, I conducted further analyses. A closer examination revealed 
results that we I did not necessarily predict. 
Money 
 Students differed in their likelihood to commit future resources to the 
situations in the present study when previously invested money was involved. 
In particular, students tended to be more likely to invest further in a romantic 
relationship when money had been spent on a partner than to invest further in 
taking an exam after money had been spent. The finding that money could 
predict the sunk-cost effect in a romantic relationship is inconsistent with 
research by Goodfriend and Agnew (2008) who argued that money is a 
material resource that is not linked to happiness in relationships.  
 Prior research about the effects of resources on the likelihood to 
escalate commitment in interpersonal relationships has mainly been anecdotal 
(Lala, 2005). It might be possible that while college students report that 
money does not—or should not—predict future commitment in a romantic 
relationship, the reality is that money might predict future commitment in a 
population of college students. This result might have been easier to explain if 
we knew how participants viewed money. Perhaps, students might have 
viewed money as an intangible investment in a romantic relationship—
something that they could not recover. Thus, they might have been more 
likely to escalate commitment in the relationship, because as Goodfriend and 
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Agnew (2008) found, intangible investments are more likely to predict future 
commitment in a romantic relationship.    
 The finding that students commit the sunk-cost fallacy (albeit to a low 
degree) for the exam situation is supported by previous research that has 
found that prior investments of money predict the sunk-cost effect (Arkes & 
Blumer, 1985). However, I  predicted that students would commit the sunk-
cost fallacy more for the exam (or individual) situation than for the 
interpersonal situations. This prediction was not supported in the present 
study.          
 There are several reasons why sunk-cost fallacy scores for the resource 
of money were lowest in the exam situation.  It is important to point out that if 
the exam situation was not compared against the interpersonal situations, then 
I might have concluded that money predicted the sunk-cost effect in an 
individual situation. Aware of this limitation of prior research, I wanted to 
compare an individual situation against interpersonal situations to observe 
differences—or similarities between situation types. Perhaps a prior 
investment of money did not really motivate students to continue investing 
future resources to a failing course of action (an exam that they performed 
poorly on).         
 Although previous research has not yet investigated this possibility, 
students perhaps felt that their chances of future gain (doing well if they 
continued taking the exam) were bleak. Staw (1981) explained that people 
might reduce future commitment to a course of action if they perceive that 
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future gains are nearly impossible. Thus, they may be less likely to commit 
the sunk-cost fallacy. The type of individual situation we used in this study 
may also help to explain our results. We constructed an exam vignette, 
because about all college students have taken standardized exams and many 
college students will likely take standardized exams to obtain admittance to a 
graduate school, law school, or medical school. Metalsky et. al (1982) studied 
how attributional styles affected students’ reactions to a low exam grade. The 
researchers found that students with an internal and global attributional style 
(likely to attribute their poor exam grade to their performance) were more 
likely to report being depressed than were students with an external and 
specific attributional style (likely to attribute their poor exam grade to a bad 
day or a poorly written test, for example). Results from this study suggest that 
attributional styles along with invested money may predict students’ future 
commitment to taking an exam. Future studies should investigate this 
relationship.        
 Why other researchers suggest that money predicts the sunk-cost effect 
in all individual situations requires further investigation. As our results 
suggest, students may have perceived that doing better was beyond their 
control even though money had been invested. Perhaps in other sunk-cost 
situations in the extant literature, students felt greater personal control over 
their course of action or maybe didn’t care. For example, in Coleman’s study 
of college students’ commitment to medical treatment, he asked students to 
imagine going to a chiropractor’s website and finding out that a special deal 
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was being offered but later finding out that there’s a physical therapist that has 
a better chance of curing their condition (Coleman, 2010a).   
 While Coleman’s study is ambitious, it might be possible that college 
students might find it harder to imagine or personally identify with a situation 
that many of them have never been placed in, while they might be more likely 
to identify with an exam situation. Thus, Coleman’s finding that money 
predicted the sunk-cost effect for the medical treatment situation may be the 
result of students imagining having personal control over a situation that they 
did not particular identify with, thus students were more likely to commit the 
sunk-cost fallacy. Future research should compare two situations in which 
students feel they have personal control or lack control over the situation and 
see how these differences may predict the sunk-cost effect.   
 Overall, the finding that college students slightly differed in how they 
committed the sunk-cost fallacy for the exam situation and romantic 
relationship situations suggests that college students might mentally account 
for money differently between both situation types. Future research should 
investigate this possibility. 
Time 
 The finding that students were significantly more likely to remain 
committed to an interpersonal relationship even when a friend or romantic 
partner had stopped communicating with and supporting them is important. 
This finding is consistent with research by Goodfriend and Agnew (2008) that 
found that time is an intangible investment that may predict future 
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commitment in romantic relationships.     
 Although participants did commit the sunk-cost fallacy for time in the 
exam situation, these participants’ mean sunk-cost fallacy scores were the 
lowest for any of the resources, suggesting that time might lead to a lesser 
tendency of people escalating commitment to a previous course of action in an 
individual situation. This finding can be supported by recent research by 
Soman and Coleman who found that people were less likely to commit the 
sunk-cost fallacy for time, because people can’t mentally account for time in 
the same way that they can account for money (Soman, 2001; Coleman, 
2010).          
 Soman explained that investments of time did not motivate people to 
remain committed to a failing course of action, unless a particular situation 
was expressed in monetary terms. It is possible that mental accounting played 
a role in our study, whereby participants were unable to adequately mentally 
account for time. This could explain why participants with the time resource 
for the exam situation had the lowest sunk-cost fallacy scores. However, 
because we did observe a sunk-cost effect for time for the exam situation, that 
might suggest that maybe participants could be better at mentally accounting 
for time in situations that are particularly relevant to them. For example, while 
it may be difficult for participants to imagine escalating commitment to 
inferior medical treatment in Coleman’s hypothetical situation, they might be 
better able to account for time for a situation in which most of them have 
probably experienced—studying for an exam and doing poorly and 
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considering whether or not to retake it.     
 Our findings regarding how investments of time could differ between 
situation types further illustrates the purpose of the present study, which was 
to show that resources differ depending on context. Thus, researchers that 
have studied the sunk-time cost effects in individual contexts should perhaps 
make a caveat based on our findings:  People are better at mentally accounting 
for time in interpersonal relationships, although they aren’t as well-versed in 
mentally accounting for time in individual situations. Future research should 
compare an individual and interpersonal situation that both involve explicit 
mental accounting and investigate whether there are differences or similarities 
in participants’ future commitment.   
Emotion 
 Students were just as likely to commit the sunk-cost fallacy for the 
exam situation as they were for the interpersonal situations. This suggests that 
emotions about the exam likely drove participants to commit future resources 
to taking the exam repeatedly. To date, the only study that investigates the 
role of emotion on the sunk-cost effect in an individual situation is Coleman’s, 
who found that participants who were made angry were more likely to commit 
the sunk-cost fallacy (Coleman, 2010).    
 Although we are limited in interpreting how students felt as they 
imagined having to make the choice of taking an exam again after doing 
poorly, it’s possible that as students placed themselves in the situation, they 
became angry with themselves for having done poorly the first time and as a 
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result, were more likely to keep investing future resources to taking the test. 
Students who felt upset about receiving an inadequate exam score were 
perhaps more likely to escalate commitment, because they assumed personal 
control over the situation and were optimistic about future gains (Lerner & 
Keltner, 2000; Coleman, 2010).       
 The finding that students are no more likely to commit the sunk-cost 
fallacy for an exam situation than for an interpersonal situation calls into 
question how college students view emotions in romantic relationships and 
friendships. Research by Labouvie-Vief et. al. (1989) and Carstensen and 
Turk-Charles (1994) suggests that older adults are better at understanding 
emotion states and are better at controlling emotions than are younger adults 
such as college students. Thus, age differences in the salience of emotion 
might help to explain why emotion was not the resource that predicted the 
greatest sunk-cost effect for the interpersonal situations. Perhaps college 
students are better at mentally accounting for time than they are for emotions. 
A future study should further isolate these variables to determine which is 
more predictive of future commitment in interpersonal relationships. 
Effort 
 Like the present study’s results about the effects of emotions on both 
situation types, results about invested effort revealed that students were also as 
likely to commit the sunk-cost fallacy for the individual and interpersonal 
situations. Effort has been repeatedly stated as one of the predictors of the 
sunk-cost effect (Arkes & Blumer, 1985), but only recently has effort been 
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isolated to determine its effects on the sunk-cost effect. Coleman (2010a) 
found that participants in the effort condition were the worst at mentally 
accounting for effort when compared to participants in the time and money 
conditions. Coleman concluded that this was the case, because either people 
have not practiced keeping track of expended effort or did not care to keep 
track of it.         
 Because I did find that people committed the sunk-cost fallacy for 
effort in the exam situation, this might suggest that participants were 
motivated to expend additional effort to do better on the exam. The theory of 
learned industriousness (Eisenberger, 1992) may help to explain why a prior 
investment of effort could lead to further investments of effort in an exam 
situation. Learned industriousness theory suggests that rewarding the 
completion of a difficult task may make the difficult task seem less aversive; 
thus, people may be more likely to invest high effort. When this theory is 
applied to the exam situation, it might seem plausible to imagine that if 
students imagined that future invested effort would be rewarded by receiving 
the score that they needed on the exam for graduate school admittance, then 
they were perhaps more motivated to continue investing effort to see the 
reward come to fruition. 
Self-Concept 
 Similar to the results of both emotion and effort, results about the 
effects of self-concept on future commitment revealed that participants were 
just as likely to escalate commitment in the exam situation as they were to do 
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the same in the interpersonal situations. Put even more simply, the way 
participants viewed themselves did not change their commitment behavior in 
either situation type.         
 I predicted that cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) would 
account for escalation of commitment for the self-concept resource, or that 
once people’s opinions of themselves came into conflict with a particular 
choice (for example, viewing themselves as a caring friend but then faced 
with the option of ending the friendship), people might be more likely to 
remain committed to a particular course of action to avoid viewing themselves 
as a bad friend for example. The results of the present study suggest that 
dissonance may have occurred, leading participants to escalate commitment in 
order to reduce a dissonant view of themselves. People may be likely to 
escalate commitment in the presence of dissonance whether the situation is 
individual such as the exam or interpersonal if their view of themselves is 
consistent across situations. 
Personality 
 Results did not support what others have found about the relationship 
between personality and sunk-cost: conscientious and neurotic individuals are 
perhaps more likely to commit the sunk-cost fallacy (Moon, 2001; Moon et 
al., 2003). There are a couple explanations for the present study’s findings. 
The personality inventory that I used was different from the one that Moon 
and colleagues used. I did not split neuroticism into its constructs, therefore, 
maybe I was unable to observe the effects that these specific constructs might 
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have had on sunk-cost behavior.  Alternatively, our finding that personality 
did not influence sunk-cost behavior may suggest that the situation is a better 
predictor of behavior than personality. This explanation can be supported by 
research that shows that personality is not consistent from situation to 
situation and that there are low correlations between personality and behavior 
(Kenrick & Funder, 1991; Mischel, 1968). 
Sex 
 Although we did not manipulate sex in our study, the finding that men 
had higher sunk-cost fallacy scores in the exam situation and women had 
higher sunk-cost fallacy scores in the friend situation merits some discussion.
 Unfortunately, it is not possible to know how men felt about the exam 
situation, because I did not ask them. It could be possible that men became 
angry at the thought of not doing well on the exam the first time around. 
Consistent with research on emotion and escalation of commitment, if men 
were emotionally aroused to the point of anger about the exam, then they 
might have been more likely to commit the sunk-cost fallacy, because they 
would have assumed personal control over the situation.    
 I also do not know why women committed the sunk-cost fallacy more 
than men did for the friend situation, although research can provide an 
explanation. Women are likely to engage in long-term care giving with a 
friend, while men are more likely to engage in short-term heroic acts and be 
done (Eagly, 1987). Similarly, Gabriel and Gardner (1999) found that men 
spend more effort with groups while women spend more effort with individual 
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friends, similar to the situation in the present study’s vignette. Based on this 
research, women are more likely than men to have the desire to escalate 
commitment to an individual friend, similar to situation in the present study. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
There are several limitations in the present study. Perhaps one of the 
biggest limitations is an inability to explain why participants committed the 
sunk-cost fallacy for each level of resource and situation. While I thought that 
personality would explain sunk-cost behavior, I found that it did not.  Maybe 
if I had included a more detailed personality inventory that split neuroticism 
into its constructs of anxiety and depression, I might have found results more 
consistent with previous research that linked neuroticism to the sunk-cost 
effect (Moon, 2001). As the discussion of each resource may have revealed, 
there might be several other explanations for why participants chose to 
escalate commitment such as attribution theory, learned industriousness and 
cognitive dissonance. I  might have learned more about participants’ motives 
behind their decisions had I asked them to explain why they made the decision 
they made or by including, for example, an inventory that measured 
participants’ anger and fear to enable us to determine whether those emotions 
indeed influenced the sunk-cost effect.     
 Another limitation of the present study was the use of only one 
scenario for the individual situation. While one situation helped me to observe 
differences between both situation types, it might have been more revealing if 
I had included another situation—perhaps about another topic that is relevant 
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to college students. Another individual situation may have enabled us to better 
generalize our findings. Perhaps there are differences within individual 
situations that might explain how these situations would differ with 
interpersonal situations.      
 The present study opens up many different possibilities for future 
research. Researchers could further investigate the role that self-concept plays 
in the sunk-cost effect. They can also conduct studies to tease apart the role 
that emotions and time play in people committing the sunk-cost fallacy.  
 The present study took on the enormous task of addressing many 
limitations that have existed in previous sunk-cost research. The present study 
adds to the literature by showing that the situation type does lead people to 
commit future resources differently. In particular, college students may be 
more likely to remain committed to interpersonal relationships even when 
things are going sour because of time and money already spent building the 
relationship; however, they are more likely to break off commitment to an 
exam if they’d already invested a large amount of time preparing. The present 
study has implications for intervention research that may want to target 
particular resources that predict the escalation of commitment in a population 
of college students.  
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Capstone Summary 
Background 
Stop what you’re doing right now and recall a time you waited in a 
long line at the movie theater to watch a movie that you begrudgingly decided 
to give a try. Thirty minutes later you took your seat, watched the opening 
credits, and realized that you should have watched something else. Did you 
leave immediately or did you keep watching?   
 Now reflect on another situation: You were friends with someone for 
two years and he or she abruptly stopped calling you, responding to your 
messages, or being supportive of your future goals or interests. Did you break 
off the friendship immediately, wait a little while longer to see if the 
friendship get better, or did you stay committed? Did you have a romantic 
relationship that seemed to be going bad? Did you stay? Did you leave? 
 Why people continue to commit further to an apparent failing course 
of action is nothing new. Psychologists and economists refer to this 
phenomenon as the “sunk-cost fallacy,” or “sunk-cost effect,” because the 
prior investment that has already been made is “sunk” and it should have no 
influence on future decisions (Arkes & Blumer, 1985). The reality is: People 
do not like to waste what has already been invested, so they continue to invest 
even more, particularly money, time, and effort (Arkes & Blumer, 1985). 
Many psychologists and economists call this tendency to further commit an 
escalation of commitment. Escalation of commitment and the sunk-cost 
fallacy are related; when people perceive that they have invested too much to 
quit” (Teger, 1980), they often tend to invest further—or escalate 
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commitment.         
 While a lot of fascinating research has been done on behavioral sunk 
costs, unfortunately there are many limitations. For one, many articles discuss 
the commonly cited three resources that predict the sunk-cost effect: money, 
time, and effort, yet most of these studies have only focused on the effect that 
money has on sunk-cost behavior. What about time and effort?  
 Within recent years, some researchers have begun to explore the 
effects that time and effort have on the sunk-cost fallacy. Soman (2001) found 
that money, but not time, predicted the sunk-cost effect, because people 
cannot mentally account for time in the way that they account for money. To 
extend Soman’s research, Coleman (2010) investigated the individual effects 
of money, time, and effort. Consistent with Soman’s research, Coleman found 
that money did predict the sunk-cost effect, but time and effort did not. 
Coleman explained that people are not mentally good at accounting for effort 
either.         
 Although Soman and Coleman have paved the way for future studies 
to investigate the way that individual resources influence the sunk-cost 
fallacy, there is still another big limitation in the field of sunk-cost to address: 
There are opposing findings about sunk-cost effects in the literature about 
sunk-costs in interpersonal relationships. For example, although Arkes and 
Blumer have found that money predicts the sunk-cost fallacy in an individual 
situation (a situation where one makes a decision by himself, such as 
continuing to watch a boring movie), research by Goodfriend and Agnew 
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(2008) showed that money did not predict the sunk-cost effect in interpersonal 
relationships, because people don’t tie happiness to money.  
Methodology 
Based on such a discrepancy in findings between the two situation 
types, the present study investigated what would happen if both situation types 
were manipulated in the same study. In particular, the initial research question 
was: Whether the resources that people invest in an individual situation, for 
example, would predict the sunk-cost effect, but that these same resources 
would not predict the sunk-cost effect in an interpersonal situation? Several 
resources that people invest into either situation type were selected after 
research into both literatures on the sunk-cost effect. Money, time, and effort 
were automatically selected, and then emotion and self-concept were chosen. 
Emotion and self-concept are listed as resources that predict the sunk-cost 
fallacy in the literature about sunk costs in interpersonal relationships. 
However, emotion was nearly absent from the literature on sunk costs in 
individual situations while self-concept was never mentioned.   
 A population of college students was selected, because research 
indicates that this age group is more likely than older adults to commit the 
sunk-cost fallacy, perhaps because younger adults focus more on losses than 
gains (Strough et al., 2008). In addition, the present study wanted to 
investigate why college students remain in relationships (friendships and 
romantic relationships) even when things start to go bad.   
 Two hundred seven students at Syracuse University were recruited to 
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complete the study. Each student came in and completed a packet of questions 
that pertained to one of the resources that was manipulated (money, time, 
emotion, effort, and self-concept). Each packet had three different types of 
situations (an exam situation, romantic relationship, and friend situation) 
pertaining to the particular resource. For example, a student may have 
received an exam situation for money that read, “You spent $30 preparing for 
a standardized exam. After taking the exam, you received a score lower than 
what’s required to be admitted to your program of choice. Considering all the 
factors involved, how many more times will you take the exam?” The exam 
situation represented the individual situation type, and this particular type of 
situation was chosen because it is one that college students have had 
experience with.         
 Each of the three situations in the packet had a parallel situation but 
with another level of investment. For example, one vignette may have asked 
students about spending $30 (which was regarded as the low investment), but 
students were also asked the same question, only with a different level of 
investment: $1,500 (the high investment). To compute students’ sunk-cost 
fallacy scores, their selections for the high and low investment conditions 
were compared. If students chose to take the exam more times because of a 
large investment paid, then they committed the sunk-cost fallacy.  
 After students completed the packet, they completed a brief 
personality inventory, because previous research suggests that 
conscientiousness and neuroticism can predict the sunk-cost effect (Moon 
 43
2001; Moon et al. 2003). Students then filled out a demographics 
questionnaire that asked them questions such as their age, sex, and they were 
also asked to rate the resources in order of importance for each situation type. 
Results and Discussion 
The type of situation and the type of resource did interact with each 
other to exert an influence on sunk-cost fallacy scores. Students were more 
likely to spend more time in a friendship and romantic relationship if they had 
previously invested time, but they were less likely to continue taking an exam 
if they had previously invested a large amount of time. Students were slightly 
more likely to remain committed to a romantic relationship if money had been 
invested than they were to continue taking an exam if they had invested 
money. While students committed the sunk-cost fallacy for emotion, effort, 
and self-concept, the difference between situation types were not statistically 
significant.         
 The reasons behind the present study’s findings are explained in depth 
in the Capstone paper; however, the major finding in this study is that invested 
time overwhelmingly predicts future commitment in college relationships 
(friendships and romantic relationships). This finding has implications for 
intervention studies that might want to investigate ways to alter sunk-cost 
behavior, at least among college students. The present study investigated the 
individual role of different types of resources in different types of situations to 
give researchers more insight on the type of resources that should be targeted 
in an intervention. Based on the results of the present study, teaching students 
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that previously invested time is irretrievable—and thus should not have an 
impact on future decisions—miight be a good start. 
 
